Sexual Harassment

26/07/2017

Sexual Harassment

In Feminism Issues and Arguments Jennifer Saul points out that some writers, including feminist writers, argue that sexual harassment laws and regulations encourage men and women to think of women as being in need of protection from sexually offensive verbal behaviour that men would take in their stride. It would be better, these writers suggest, if feminists encouraged women to be strong and assertive. Saul thinks, however, that this is to misconceive the nature of sexual harassment laws, which in fact are applicable only to severe cases of offensive behaviour. In the USA, she says, two forms of sexual harassment are distinguished: first, there is quid pro quo sexual harassment, which occurs when a person in a position of authority demands sexual favours in return for hiring, promoting, or rewarding with good grades, or threatens, if refused, to hire someone else or to demote or mark down that person.

Second, there is what is known as hostile environment sexual harassment, which is verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, including unwelcome sexual advances, which has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with a person’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

For some writers, such as Katherine McKinnon, sexual harassment is a form of discrimination against women insofar as it disadvantages them. In her view it is vital to maintaining a system in which men are dominant and women subordinate, the basis of which is sexual in the sense that men are sexually dominant and women are sexually submissive. Thus, sexual harassment involves the introduction of a sexual dynamic to workplaces and educational institutions and is regarded by McKinnon as a particularly central way of disadvantaging women, so that it counts as sexual harassment only if women are the victims. This means, for example, that a female professor who offers a male student a high grade in return for sex will not be guilty of sexually harassing him, and the reason is that such harassment is exclusively a form of male discrimination against women.

That is McKinnon’s view, but Saul disagrees and argues that men can also be the victims of sexual harassment, as can men or women who are sexually bullied by someone of their own sex. She favours, instead, what she refers to as the difference approach, according to which sexual harassment counts as discrimination because its victims would not be treated in that way if they were of the opposite sex. On this view, however, there are some awkward cases, as when a bisexual employer is sexually offensive towards both male and female employees.

Finally, there is the stereotype approach, which rests on the idea that it is discriminatory to behave towards people in a way that is based on sex stereotypes.

Saul mentions that many people are worried ‘that any pursuit of romance or even friendship in the office [or other workplace, or an educational institution], or any mildly off-colour joke, runs the risk of being considered sexual harassment; and that any attempt to liven up a dull lecture with a bit of humour, or any friendly behaviour towards a student, may get a professor fired.’(Page 60) This, of course, is not to do with the law but with the sexual harassment policies of educational institutions and companies; some commentators, however, detect a direct connection between sexual harassment legislation and repressive institutional practices. Thus, a writer called Mane Hajdin raises the concern that ‘many institutional sexual harassment regulations, by forbidding any unwelcome sexual behaviour or comments, effectively rule out all sexual behaviour and comments in the workplace[ or educational institution]. He takes this to be an unacceptable restriction, and claims that it is an inevitable consequence of sexual harassment law. Accordingly, he argues that there should be no laws against sexual harassment.’(Page 63) The reason, according to Hajdin, is that if the policy is to forbid all unwelcome sexual conduct or conversation, then what happens in practice is that one steers clear of anything to do with sex, just to be on the safe side, because how is one to know whether or not it will be welcome?

A point that needs to be emphasised here is that these institutional policies are far stricter than the laws against sexual harassment that Saul described earlier, where the treatment of an employee or student counts as sexual harassment only if it creates a hostile work or study environment or otherwise interferes with one’s ability to work or study.

Part of the problem, according to Saul, is that there is too much confusion as to what exactly should count as sexual harassment. To add to that confusion, there is also the question of whether certain forms of non-sexual behaviour should also count as sexual harassment, the obvious example being behaviour that is sexist rather than sexual. Suppose, for instance, that a male employee whose colleagues are all women is constantly teased by them for being physically weak and for being meek and unassertive, their attitude being sexist in the sense that they disparage him for not being a proper man. Suppose, too, that in this way they create a hostile working environment and make his life a misery. Then the argument would be that this, too, should count as sexual harassment, even though their approach to him is not a sexual one. In this area, too, according to Saul, there is a great deal of confusion as to the correct point of view.

Perhaps I could now make some general remarks about these and related issues. To begin with, it is worth asking whether it makes sense to single out sexual harassment from harassment in general. To make clear the point of the question, I shall define a new category of harassment, which I shall refer to as money harassment. This takes two forms: first, there is quid pro quo money harassment, which occurs when a person in a position of authority demands money in return for hiring, promoting or rewarding with good grades, or threatens, if refused, to hire someone else or to demote or mark down that person. Second, there is what is known as hostile environment money harassment, which is verbal or physical conduct of a money-related nature, including unwelcome money-related advances, which has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with a person’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

It may seem that I have parodied the two forms of sexual harassment, but my purpose is to ask a serious question, and to that end I shall illustrate the two forms of money harassment. Suppose, for instance, that a professor  demands money from a student in return for higher grades or threatens to mark her down if she refuses. Then this would be a case of money harassment, except that it would more properly be characterised as a case of gross professional misconduct, as would the parallel case of demanding sex in return for unfair grades.

Now suppose that a well-off employee’s colleagues have much less money than him and that they create a hostile working environment by continually taunting him about his wealth, as also by dipping their hands into his pockets and fondling his wallet against his wishes. Then this, too, is a case of money harassment, except that it is more properly described as bullying and intimidation. Such cases are already covered by the policies of many companies with regard to working conditions or relations between workers.

This raises a question as to what the point is supposed to be of creating a separate law or separate regulations with regard to money harassment, and by extension with regard to sexual harassment. But then, a similar question could be asked about laws and regulations against workplace racism: if a man is taunted and bullied in the workplace, so that his working life is made miserable, why should we give any special significance to cases in which his ill-treatment is racist in character? Surely what matters is the fact of his being ill-treated, not the category into which it falls.

One response to this line of reasoning is to claim that anti-racist workplace regulations are to be understood in the context of our living in a society in which racism is both virulent and rife, so that all manifestations of it should be stamped out, if necessary by regulating against it in particular situations. But the fact remains that if a black worker’s life is being made miserable by racist taunts and abuse, then that counts as harassment and bullying, which is, or should be, already covered by existing regulations. And a similar point could be made about a woman worker who is subjected to sexual or sexist taunts and made unhappy because of it.

Perhaps we should consider the argument that the point of such regulations is to help to sharpen one’s awareness of the offensive nature of certain forms of behaviour. Suppose, for instance, that a black woman is popular with her white colleagues, partly because she has learnt how to deal with their racial prejudice and teasing, treating it as good-natured banter which she repays in kind. Then some people would argue that although in this case the woman gets on with her co-workers, there is a wider context in which their racial prejudice and antipathy is being reinforced, just as the woman is constantly being reminded of her perceived otherness and racial difference. The implication here is that more virulent forms of racism are being fed by this emphasis on the colour of her skin; this, however, is debatable, and in any case it is far removed from a workplace situation in which bullying and intimidation occur.

Let us now consider the parallel question about sexual harassment. If we query whether sexual harassment should be singled out by workplace regulations or by laws, then one response is to claim that it at least draws attention to certain forms of offensive behaviour which may not be covered by existing workplace policies. Suppose, for instance, that a man’s female colleagues constantly draw attention to his sexual attractiveness, make personal remarks about his sexual prowess and his sexual exploits with his girlfriends, together, perhaps, with sexist remarks about his being good at DIY and hopeless at cooking, when in fact the reverse is the case, and so on. Then the claim would be that such behaviour, though apparently harmless in itself, in fact reinforces gender stereotypes and should be found offensive even if no offence is taken. Whether it should be found offensive is again debatable, but the point, at least in my view, is that legislating against it would be repressive, to say the least of it. And if in particular cases such behaviour in fact gives offence, then surely it is part of the give and take of human relations to be able to deal at a personal level with being made to feel uncomfortable, without needing the protection of rules and regulations.

Perhaps we need to remind ourselves what workplace relations between the sexes and between workers in general are like. If people enjoy working together, for instance in an office, then very often one finds that they are able to defuse tension and relieve stress by teasing, joking and engaging in non-stop banter, much of which depends on stereotyping and categorising one another, thereby both creating and releasing tension. Other forms of tension do not need to be created, and these include power relation tension, sexual tension, racial tension, cross-cultural tension, tension between personalities, tension associated with political or religious differences, mild cabin fever, and so on and so on. And yet, these people still manage to get on and to enjoy working together, partly because they learn to avoid certain topics and certain forms of behaviour with certain individuals, but also by being free to tease one another and engage in banter and in joking together without fear of causing offence; and this is possible because, above all else, they learn to tolerate one another’s weaknesses, faults and idiosyncrasies. This, in my view, is what we should be aiming to encourage, not the creating of a stultifying atmosphere in which people are increasingly reluctant to be spontaneous, afraid as they are of causing offence, and are themselves more willing to take offence.

Answer to Last Puzzle

I reproduce it here:

            99        45        39        36        28        21

72        27        18        21        ?          13        7

The above two rows of numbers are connected in such a way that the ? stands for a particular number. What is it? Note that the '7' is not a typo.

99 is the sum of the number below it and the one to the left of that number. The same with 45 and 39. So it looks like the missing number is 15. 28, after all, is the sum of 13 and 15. But 21 is not the sum of 13 and 7.
Start again: 99 is the sum of the number below it and the one to the left of that number; but also, 9+9 plus 7+2 = 27, 4+5 plus 2+7 = 18, 3+9 plus 1+8 = 21...Using this rule, 3+6 plus 2+1 = 12, which is the answer.

This Week's Puzzle
Cheryl's birthday party
This is a well-known puzzle which tests the ability, the same as with the hat problem, to reason from the perspective of another person; in this case the perspective of Albert and Bernard, each working with the information that they know that the other has. Answer next week.

Albert and Bernard have just become friends with Cheryl, and they want to know when her birthday is. Cheryl gives them a list of 10 possible dates:

May		15	16			19
June				17	18
July	14		16
August	14	15		17

Cheryl then tells Albert and Bernard separately the month and the day of her birthday respectively.

Albert: I don't know when Cheryl's birthday is, but I know that Bernard doesn't know, either
Bernard: At first I did not know when Cheryl's birthday was, but I know now.
Albert: Then I also know when Cheryl's birthday is.
So when is Cheryl's birthday?

Note: I've copied the above text and table from an online site; but the first line does not make it clear that Albert knows that Bernard knows the day, and Bernard knows that Albert knows the month.If they did not know this about each other, there would be no answer and in that sense no puzzle. N.B. Each hears the answers given by the other.