Another handout, 17,03,09

Last time I posted, I included a piece on speciesism, arguing that other species should be subject to the rules of a civilised society, the same as human beings are. The following week's handout picked up on that theme. Here it is.

My aim in proposing that the criminal law should be applied to non-human higher animals was to call into question the distinction that Singer makes between persons and other forms of sentient life, including human beings who are not persons. He elevates to personhood those humans who are rational, self-conscious and contributing to a pension fund or otherwise exhibiting awareness of the future.There is, however, another criterion of being a person, namely that one should be morally responsible for one’s actions, on which basis it seems to me that the big cats are to be held accountable for their murderous easting habits. If to this it is objected that lions, tigers and others have no moral sense, then surely the same is true of human beings who commit the worst crimes, and yet we still condemn them and visit retribution upon them.

What is also true is that the reason that lions and other predators are allowed to terrorise zebras, wildebeest and other grazing animals of the African savannah is that we regard these latter as inferior species whose place in the natural scheme of things is to be mauled to death on television. Just imagine the outcry there would be if the lions of the Serengeti acquired a taste for human meat and took to stalking and killing tourists. No doubt Singer would say that tourists are persons, whereas wildebeest are devoid of rationality, self-consciousness and so on, therefore their lives have no intrinsic worth; but I do not think that the wildebeest would agree, and it seems to me to be self-serving of Singer to devise criteria of intrinsic worth which, surprise, surprise, just happen to be satisfied by writers of ethics books.

It seems to me that even if the large herbivores of the African plains are not as mentally sophisticated as we are, they still have intrinsic worth, or at least that we are intellectually free to value them highly if we choose. We need to advance arguments, of course, but this is easily done. Take, for instance, the herds of zebra who wander across our television screens – they may not be self-conscious, though some of them are quite shy, and if they were rational they would not be zebras, but it is obvious that they have a strong dislike of being torn to pieces by feline death squads. They spend all their waking life in a state of terror, and they even have to sleep standing up and with their eyes open. Singer is supposed to be a caring person, but where is his pity for the zebras of this world? I read somewhere that when psychological tests were performed on them it was found that they suffer from anxiety and depression, irritable bowel syndrome and insomnia, all of which are stress-related, and that basically they live lives of quiet desperation. Singer would say that the suffering of a zebra counts for less than that of a person, but it seems to me that fear and pain are just as real for a zebra as they are for us.

I think that the wilderness areas of the world should be brought under the rule of law, as happened in 19^th century America with the taming of the Wild West. In Africa an example could be made of the lions, who should be taken to safari parks and have their cubs removed to a place of safety where they could be part of a captive breeding programme to turn lions into domestic pets for those with large gardens. The zebras, wildebeest and other law-abiding large grazers would then be able to enjoy some quality of life and at last find happiness. Our children and theirs could play peacefully together without fear of being disembowelled by feline psychopaths and serial killers.

Preparation for next week

Hume on Causation.

Last week we looked at his thesis that ideas are derived from impressions, so that, for instance, the idea of red is derived from the experience of red, and we asked whether it is possible to have the concept of red without having seen the colour.

Let us now see what Hume has to say about the idea or concept of cause and effect. In the Treatise he claims that if objects are to affect one another, they need to be contiguous, by which he means that they need to be in contact, as with billiard balls, or at least to be connected by a chain of contiguous objects or events.

Also, we may ask whether a particular effect could occur with a different cause. Suppose that I light a match by striking it against a matchbox; it makes sense to say that I am the cause, or part of the cause, of the match being lit, but it is also clear that someone else could have stuck the match, in which case it does not seem to be true that the particular effect depended on the particular cause. On the other hand, no-one else would have struck the match in exactly the way I did, so could it be argued that the effect would have been slightly different?

Hume considers the principle that every event has a cause. He asks about the nature of this principle, and points out that it does not seem to be a logical principle, since we can at least conceive of an uncaused event. But what does this prove? If you read Barry Stroud’s book on Hume, you will find him claiming that we can imagine something to be true when in fact its truth is logically impossible. Suppose it is claimed that I can ‘conceive’ of this answer being correct, but in fact it is logically impossible for it to be correct, since it’s the wrong answer. So we still seem to be left with the question of whether uncaused events are possible.

One thing that is clear, in any case, is that there is an intimate connection between causation and empirical inference. Hume is interested in cases in which there is a causal relation between an observed and an unobserved event, such that the unobserved event is expected to occur. For instance, I strike a match and expect it to burst into flame, the first event being the cause of the second; or I remember boiling the kettle and expect the water to be hot; or I press a light switch and expect instant illumination. According to Hume, it is not by reason alone that we derive causal inferences. For instance, I cannot observe a match, or the rubbing of the match head against a rough surface, and deduce from this alone that a match can burst into flame. It is only through experience, first-hand or otherwise, that I make the connection or form the expectation. Is this correct? Whatever the answer, it has to be said that in very many cases we cannot infer backwards from a person’s belief or expectation to its source in their experience. It could be, for instance, that I expect the match to light although this is the first match I have ever seen, and that I am not able to explain my expectation. Do you agree?

So it could be argued that Hume’s thesis is highly theoretical in its claim that all empirical knowledge is based on experience, since very often we are not able to specify that experience. On the other hand, it could also be said that experience is the only candidate; for instance, it seems unlikely that I am genetically programmed to expect a match to flare up when struck.

If my only guide is experience, then what kind of experience is needed for me to form a belief about cause and effect? Hume’s answer is that it is through the constant conjunction of objects or events that we come to establish a causal relation between them and to expect the one on the basis of the other. It is clear that Hume is on to something here, but there are difficulties in trying to pin it down. For one thing, expectation or inference is not always the same as belief about cause and effect. When I view a familiar landscape I expect to see particular features, and this is because of their constant conjunction, but there need be no causal connection between them, or between the walls of this room, or between many of the things I associate through familiarity. Clearly, inference from the observed to the unobserved is much more general than causal inference.

If a particular inference from the observed to the unobserved has its source in experience, then what about its justification? Hume says that if events A and B are constantly conjoined, then we may come to expect A on the basis of B. He then goes on to say that this expectation is completely ungrounded. If A and B are genuinely distinct, then there is no logical relation in the inference from one to the other. He shows this by pointing out that there is no logical contradiction in denying that A follows B. Thus, I can imagine that I strike a match and yet it does not ignite, and that this occurs even in optimal conditions for ignition, such as the match and striking surface both being dry, and so on. The only other possible justification, he says, is by appeal to what he calls the principle of the uniformity of nature. On that basis we could argue as follows: in the past we have had a great deal of success inferring from one event to another on the basis of constant conjunction; therefore, we should continue with that form of inference. This is known, by the way, as inductive inference. But Hume replies that the justification is question-begging, since it relies on induction in order to justify induction.

This is Hume’s problem of induction; it states that inductive inference cannot be grounded in logic and that the appeal to the uniformity of nature is question-begging, therefore inductive inference cannot be justified. By way of illustration, suppose I am asked how I know that the sun will rise tomorrow and that I reply that I know it because the sun has always risen in the past. But now the sceptic will point out that there is no logical connection between past frequency and future occurrence; and if I try to appeal to the uniformity of nature, claiming that inductive inference has worked in the past, therefore it is likely to work in the future, then the sceptic will accuse me of begging the question, since I presuppose that induction is justified in order to show that it is justified.

Bertrand Russell gives the example of a turkey expecting to be fed every morning because it always has been fed, and not realizing the ominous significance of the fact that Christmas is coming.

Last post's puzzle

A map of the red planet displays newly discovered cities and waterways. Start at the city T on the south pole.
Travelling along the canals, visiting each city only once and returning to the starting point, can you spell out a sentence in English?

This problem, by the prolific American puzzle inventor Sam Loyd, is more than a hundred years old.
He wrote that ‘when the puzzle originally appeared in a magazine, more than fifty thousand readers reported “There is no possible way.” Yet it is a very simple puzzle.’ You will kick yourself if you read the answer before you work it out.

The answer The answer is "there is no possible way"

  

This post's puzzle

Berta says that Greta tells lies.

Greta says that Rosa tells lies.

Rosa says that both Berta and Greta tell lies. 

Which one is telling the truth?